With the persecution of the Rohingya minority within Myanmar ongoing, Johnny Lumley looks at the origins of the crisis.
The Rohingya are a Muslim ethnic minority group primarily from the Rakhine state in western Myanmar, who, despite having resided within Myanmar for centuries, lack official recognition as an ethnic community. This has led to a large population of the Rohingya being denied citizenship, making the Rohingya the largest stateless population in the world. As such the population is subject to systemic discrimination and vulnerable to human rights abuses.
The origins of this situation can be traced back to the actions of the Burma Socialist Programme Party, which in 1977-78 launched Operation Dragon King (Nagamin) in an effort to register those who are citizens, and those considered ‘foreigners.’ The operation entailed mass arrests, persecution, and violence, ultimately resulting in the mass movement of 200,000 of the Rohingya to Bangladesh.
The Rohingya are a Muslim ethnic minority group primarily from the Rakhine state in western Myanmar, who, despite having resided within Myanmar for centuries, lack official recognition as an ethnic community.
This was followed by the 1982 citizenship law, which greatly narrowed the conception of citizenship in the country. The previous laws had a single citizenship status, conferring a consistent set of rights, regardless of how citizenship was gained. The 1982 laws created subdivisions of citizenship, these subcategories being treated differently for the transmission of rights, as well as serving as the ground for deprivation, the government at the time being explicitly authorised to limit the rights of certain subcategories of citizens.
This trend of deprivation continued, the worst of which occurred in 2017, when the Myanmar government launched a campaign of terror against the Rohingya in Rakhine, destroying villages and civilian infrastructure, leading to widespread reports of human rights violations, and forcing over 700,000 to flee to Bangladesh. This caused massive strain on the refugee camps in Bangladesh’s Cox Bazar region, one of the largest and most densely populated camps in the world.
This displacement has only worsened following a coup in 2021, in which the military overthrew the democratically elected government and continued to persecute the Rohingya. This was formalised this year, with the military chief Min Aung Hlaing elected president by military backed parliamentary vote.
These actions have resulted in the Republic of Gambia launching a proceeding against the government of Myanmar in the International Court of Justice (ICJ) for violating the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide. In January of this year, Myanmar began its defence of Gambia’s charge, with some outlets reporting a final ruling to be expected by the end of this year.
While of course this represents a positive development in this humanitarian crisis, it can be seen to be emblematic of the weaning influence of international institutions, including the ICJ. Article 94 of the UN charter details that states must comply with decisions made by the ICJ, with those not in compliance being subject to the UN Security Council. Yet, the broader Myanmar crisis underscores the gap that can exist between legal judgment and enforcement, raising wider questions about the strength of international institutions in responding to mass atrocity. As geopolitical instability continues, the question of whether international institutions can remain substantive rather than symbolic remains.