What is multi-speed Europe and can it solve the EU’s problems?
For years European politicians have debated whether the European Union should move forward as a single bloc or allow groups of member states to integrate more quickly than others.
In a recent speech, European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen told a Brussels room filled with EU ambassadors that “Europe could no longer be a custodian for the old world order” and that the “well-intentioned” post-war system of consensus and compromise risked threatening the EU’s “credibility as a geopolitical actor.”
It is only the most recent instance in which Von der Leyen has reiterated her desire for a more hard-nosed interest-driven approach to EU foreign policy and her frustrations with the slow pace of EU decision making. In a letter in February to the leaders of all 27 member states she emphasised her preference for enhanced cooperation, an EU mechanism which allows some members to integrate and make decisions together without other states vetoing it. This comes after repeated efforts from countries like Germany and France for more integration around defence but also financial services.
The idea of a multispeed Europe in which member states can integrate at different speeds and according to different priorities is not a new idea. It is both a present reality and something rooted in the history of the EU itself. It gained prominence in the 1990s as the EU underwent its first big enlargement in eastern Europe and was phrased as a potential method to solve decision making differences. German politicians in particular put forward the idea of a ‘core Europe,’ one in which Germany, France and the Benelux countries would be the central core of the EU, integrating more and more, serving as a model for other countries to gravitate around.
In fact, some of the EU’s cornerstone institutions already work on a multi-speed Europe principle including the eurozone and the Schengen Area which allow members to opt in or out depending on their preference.
However, the idea remains contentious due to concerns that it could create a ‘two-tiered’ Europe with certain countries blocked out of key decision making areas. Ireland for example, has been traditionally wary of enhanced cooperation being used to centralise control of taxes and financial services. As a small state which benefits enormously from multinational investment and access to the single market, centralising tax decisions would threaten that advantage.
Further, small countries like Ireland rely on neutral institutions to balance their interests with larger economies. Partial integration over major areas risks moving the decision making process away from common institutions and towards these smaller groupings.
However, as crises continue to mount the idea persists. The Russian invasion of Ukraine, a pandemic, tariffs, threats on member state sovereignty and now oil shocks all contribute to this sense that the current world order has vanished.
And as these crises continue to shape a sense that the world is different it becomes only more likely that states within the EU, unsatisfied with its slow progression will move for change.