Judith Bellmunt Gras explores Europe's remilitarisation.
Europe's remilitarisation is seen as somewhat of a taboo topic. It carries uncomfortable memories of two world wars and contradicts the EU’s purpose of peace. However, the debate of whether the EU should be a military power is not a new one. After the Schuman Declaration in 1950, the Pleven Plan was discussed, aiming to create a European army. This was, however, eventually rejected by France, which did not want a strong German army and feared losing sovereign control.
Since then, the debate has become less relevant, with the US historically offering military and economic support to Europe—such as with the Marshall Plan in 1948—since the Second World War. In 2024, Washington invested €845 billion in defence (3.1% of GDP), almost three times the EU total of €343 billion. Moreover, approximately 78% of EU defence procurement comes from imports sourced outside the EU, primarily from the US.
With Donald Trump in power, the tables are turning. His declining support for Ukraine, violation of international law in Venezuela, and threats to invade Greenland (which would ultimately end NATO) have made the EU concerned about such dependency.
However, remilitarisation in the EU began back in 2014, with Russia’s invasion of Crimea. In 2014, military spending was at its lowest level in real terms at €188.5bn; since then it has risen every year. Statistics show the real increase from 2015 to 2025 is 99%.
At the 2014 Wales Summit, NATO members agreed to spend at least 2% of GDP on defence per year by 2024. In the Summit, NATO also agreed that at least 20% of defence expenditures be allocated to researching, developing and acquiring military equipment.
This 2% military spending increase was achieved by twenty-three of the 32 member states in 2024. In comparison, in 2014, before the goal was set, only three countries—the UK, the US and Greece—did.
However, Southern European countries such as Italy, Spain, Slovenia, Croatia and Portugal are spending less than 2%, due to fiscal constraints. Belgium, part of Western Europe, is also spending less than 2%. On the other hand, NATO estimates show that Estonia, Latvia, Greece and Poland are spending 3% and above.
Ireland has the lowest level of defence expenditure in the EU. Defence spending in 2023 was 0.2% of GDP (€1.29 billion), compared to the EU average of 1.3%. However, after the 2022 Commission on the Defence Forces Report identified major capability gaps, budget 2026 allocated €1.5 billion to Defence, an 11% increase on the previous year.
This past June 2025, NATO members agreed to increase defence spending to 5% of GDP by 2035 due to pressure from the US under Donald Trump; 3.5% is to be placed on core defence and the remaining 1.5% on wider security infrastructure.
However, Italy and Spain both raised objections. Italy proposed moving the deadline for the new target from 2032 to 2035 and removing the requirement to increase spending by 0.2% per year. Spanish Prime Minister, Pedro Sánchez, rejected the 5% increase altogether with concerns on how it will affect the Spanish welfare estate, announcing Spain is to conform to “2.1%, no more, no less." The Belgian and Slovakian government also expressed concerns but announced they will try to reach the goal.
After Russia invaded Ukraine in 2022, Europe's “second rearmament” began. In 2024, total defence expenditure by the 27 EU Member States reached €343 billion, marking a 19% increase from 2023.
Germany and France are the largest contributors, providing 26.4% and 17.4% of total EU defence spending respectively, and together making up 43.8% of all EU defence spending, totalling to €150bn, in 2024.
However, this feels comparatively small when considering that Russia has increased its defence budget by 300% and China by 600% in the last ten years. Although they have lower budgets, €107 billion and €250 billion respectively, the EDA warns they are likely to achieve greater cost-effectiveness due to lower domestic prices, integrated planning, less fragmentation and lower structural overheads.
In March of 2025, the European Commission presented the ReArm Europe plan, aiming to raise €800 billion for defence spending. It aims to introduce a new €150 billion loan instrument (SAFE) for the joint procurement of countries, promoting integration.
It will be backed by money that the European Commission will borrow from the market, and which Member States will repay under favourable conditions. EU loans must include a minimum of 65% European components. Complex defence equipment must also be produced under a European design authority to ensure intellectual property.
The European Commission will begin granting initial approval this week to the first group of EU member states applying for funding to the SAFE programme. Countries' national plans will be reviewed internally by the commission before being sent to the EU Council for approval.
Readiness 2030 (as it was renamed after concerns from Italy and Spain) also aims to redirect cohesion funds, designed to strengthen the economic, social and territorial cohesion of the EU, into areas of security and defence. Additionally, it aims to increase national fiscal flexibility by allowing EU leaders to activate the escape clause in the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP). This will permit Member States to increase national defence spending more easily. So far, 16 Member States have requested its activation.
Finally, it seeks to expand European Investment Bank loans while safeguarding its financing capacity, and to mobilise private capital through the Savings and Investments Union (SIU), from start-ups to major industry players
Many experts are raising concerns about Europe’s remilitarisation. From fears of bankruptcy caused by already indebted European countries getting more loans, to questions of where countries will source armies large enough for such remilitarization, as well as the potential feasibility of a Pan-European army considering socio-political differences across member states.
Tiago Antunes, an associate senior fellow with the European Power programme at the European Council on Foreign Relation, discusses the importance of integrated remilitarization: “Allowing EU member states to rearm independently, without coordination or clear direction, poses a grave risk to European cohesion—particularly considering the rise of far-right parties, nationalist rhetoric and democratic backsliding across parts of the continent.”
He also warns about the EU needing to work on its political policies simultaneously. “Now, as the war in Ukraine prompts the EU to confront its growing defence responsibilities, it needs a similarly strong political framework to match its military ambitions.”
In today's political climate, Europe's rearming appears to be a matter of safety and necessary autonomy. However, we must also question to what extent Europe can achieve “peace through strength”. There are real risks to remilitarisation; we just have to look at history to realise.